FARSANG Interviews: Younis Tirawi
FARSANG spoke to Palestinian reporter Younis Tirawi about the recent escalations in the West Bank, the formation of new groups such as Lion's Den, and his hopes for the future.
‘In this region, we are playing with game theory. You do not look for constants, but variables.’
Follow Younis on Twitter here.
FARSANG Journal: To start with, who are you and what do you do?
Younis Tirawi: I am an independent field reporter.
FJ: How do you approach source-gathering? Is it a combination of on-the-ground and online sources? How long have you been doing this work?
YT: I have been covering internal Palestinian affairs for 2 years now. I started covering Intra-Palestinian affairs, especially the Fatah-Hamas rift. Later on, with the intense security situation in the West Bank, I widened my coverage from Intra-Palestinian politics to a triad [PA-Hamas-Israel]. I don't cover any news from outside Israel/Palestine.
My sources are mainly from the ground. I have sources within the militant groups like in Jenin and the newly established "Lion's Den", but also with local resident "acquaintances", mainly located in the northern West Bank and Hebron. Private telegram channels have always been the most important public source, along with other apps such as Zello.
FJ: What started this new wave of fighting in the summer? Has there been a spike in Israeli settler attacks (price-tagging, destruction of agriculture...)?
YT: I wouldn't say that the wave started this summer but rather back in February. The factors that ignited this wave of fighting were several:
1. The political deadlock. Palestinians are without hope and a clear vision for the future. The PA’s postponement of the elections last year was the first trigger that made Palestinian’s think "Yes, we know Israel doesn't care about us, but now the PA doesn’t either."
2. Targeted assassinations paved the way for something we can call "lighthouses". Last February, three Palestinians were killed by Israeli undercover forces in broad daylight in the heart of Area A, supposedly fully controlled by the PA. The combination of oppression and a strong desire for revenge, made the murdered Palestinians into what we can call ‘lighthouses’, attracting more Palestinians to continue in their path - this has resulted in organisations such as the Lion’s Den, for example. In Michael Milshteins' book Not here, Not there, he describes the Palestinian generation born in the West Bank after the second Intifada [Generation Z] as not having the memory of the Intifada’s bloody scenes: fighting with tanks and helicopters raiding cities across the West Bank. Thus, the motivation for revenge is high, whilst fear is low.
3. Settler fanaticism: In light of the series of attacks that occurred in Israel in February and March, and the incitement of political leaders such as MK Ben Gavir or Yossi Dagan, the head of the "North West Bank settlements" Shomron council, Israeli settlers motivation for ‘price-tagging’ has skyrocketed. Yossi Dagan has very close contacts with the army. The fact that settlers are allowed to attack with such impunity has made them greedy. Fanatic settlers have a very clear mentality: "The only good Arab is an Arab in a grave", so they don't hesitate to realise this statement.
FJ: Do you think this will be a brief period of frequent skirmishes, or a longer period of drawn out fighting? Where is the focus point of tension now? News reports have been focusing largely on Jerusalem, but Nablus and Jenin - as well as Balata and other camps - seem like the flashpoints now?
YT: The security tensions in the West Bank depend on five questions :
First, will settler attacks increase, especially with Israeli elections nearing? The second concerns the Fatah Conference: it is expected that any ‘anti-Abbas’ Fatah members will be excluded from Fatah’s 8th conference - this will lead to an informal split within the movement. This happened in Nablus when two groups splintered. Fatah Hub was split into two last year: Mahdi Abu Ghazala Group and Fasfouru Tabuk Group, and one of them has become Lion's Den, whilst the other stayed with the PA in ‘Fatah clothing’. Then we must consider ‘lone wolves’: one lone attack will motivate another attack. More death will lead to a harsher response from the Israelis. Fourth, we have to see the development of the activation of sleeper cells in the southern West Bank and beyond focal points in Jenin and Nablus. This has actually already happened. The wave has reached Ramallah. In the last week there has been a lot of shooting towards Ofer and Beit El, Israeli settlements adjacent to Ramallah. This has also happened in south Hebron in Beit Ummar and Sa’ir, but these were not organised. Finally, we have to look at the wider Israeli operation in the North West Bank: the main question is will such an Israeli response drag the PA security apparatus into battle like in the second intifada, or even in Gaza? This is unlikely. We also have to see what the response will be from within Palestinian communities in Israel.
Currently, focal points are mainly in Jenin and Nablus. But also the town of Azzoun in Qalqilya, and villages around Ramallah and Hebron such as Sa’ir and Beit Ummar.
FJ: What is the current relationship between the various political/militant factions in the West Bank? Are Fatah and the PA losing their grip completely?
YT: In Jenin, the PA has lost full control, however it still operates at a minimum in its outskirts. Last week they tried to arrest a PIJ [Palestinian Islamic Jihad] operative known as 'A.H.' in a village, but he escaped.
In Nablus, it depends whether you are affiliated with Hamas or not, if you aren’t then you are safe. They want to be sure that the ‘Jenin model’ is replicated, but it would never be anti-PA like in Jenin.
In the rest of the West Bank, it depends. The PA’s relationship with militant groups is a spectrum. The further south you head, the harsher they become. The PA is the harshest In Jericho and Hebron, due to the necessity of maintaining calm in these areas, but also due to its geosocial nature.
FJ: Has there been an increase in Hamas & Islamic Jihad activity in the West Bank?
YT: Yes, not only an increase in activity but in their capabilities. It is important to mention that the PA is suffering from "Hamas syndrome" not "PIJ syndrome". Hamas operatives emerge only after PA's control has totally vanished, as happened in Jenin.
In Jenin, the capacity for developing IED's are unimaginable - even man-made Hedgehogs and DIY sirens have been developed. On 21/10/22, they used landmines for first time; the rest of the details are yet to be revealed.
In Nablus, the story is a bit different. In contrast to Jenin, militants are non-factional and are friends from the local community. Military capabilities are also growing, training for new members has been conducted last week, and IED developments have been noticed in the last weeks. Non-local Hamas operatives can't automatically join Lion's Den, because it isn't factional, but local. The risk for penetration by intelligence services would be high if it is open to factional interests.
In short, PIJ is growing in Jenin, while non-factional organisations are growing in Nablus and Ramallah.
FJ: What is the role of social media in this new fighting? What has the effect of Telegram and TikTok been on recent escalation? How have events such as Uday al-Tamimi’s death on CCTV impacted the youth?
YT: In the fighting hotspots, residents call Telegram channels ‘Wihdat al-Rasd’ (وحدة الرصد) ‘surveillance groups’ and ‘Irbak al-laili’ (الإرباك الليلي) ‘night riot/confusion units.’ Telegram has undoubtedly been a main contributor for the rise of tensions in the West Bank. For example, Lion's Den set up their channel and reached 100,000 followers in one week.
Videos are now being transferred from TikTok to Telegram since TikTok censorship and filtering has intensified. Uday al-Tamimi's CCTV has had the opposite effect of what Israel expected. For many, seeing him fight until his last breath has signalled to Palestinians that they would prefer to die like him, rather than by throwing stones.
FJ: Can you trace the history of Lion’s Den (عرين الأسود)? Where did they come from? Are they political / religious, or is it a broad coalition?
YT: The name ‘Lion's Den’ itself was created by Raed Sarkaji when he described the Qasba neighbourhood in the old city of Nablus as such during Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. He was assassinated by Israel in 2009.
Lion's Den’s history started with Abdelhakim Shaheen, a resident of Nablus who was kidnapped on 15.11.2021. His friends living in the old city, especially Adham Mabroka and Mohammed Dakheel, started challenging the ISF captain and refused to turn themselves in. During a voice call distributed in the media in Dec 2021, the Israeli intelligence captain allegedly told him ‘I will take your soul.’ Unsurprisingly, he wasn’t lying. Three were killed in February.
Their plan for revenge was simple: blocking the entrance to Joseph’s tomb. This was led by Ibrahim Nabulsi (killed last August) and Mahmoud Banna. However, the Israeli army killed Nabulsi and PA arrested Mosab Shtayeh. They decided to shift from defence to attack, shooting at checkpoints and settlements around Nablus.
Palestinian security officials claim that they are not tens but hundreds. The flow of funding was constant before Mosab Shtayeh’s arrest. They even offered money for any house that was damaged during clashes. With his arrest last September and the current closure in Nablus, the situation has changed.
Lion's Den isn't factional: it is composed of PIJ, Fatah, Hamas and PFLP operatives. They aren't religious by nature, but they have definitely become so lately. They know that Israel will kill them, so they try to end it religiously.
The interesting question about Lion's Den is how it will end. They have said that their aim is to ignite a "Volcano". Security officials have informed Yuval Abraham, an Israeli journalist working for +972 that the closure in Nablus will remain as long as there is a threat for more attacks on Israeli soldiers and settlers.
FJ: Does Lion's Den have a political program?
YT: To understand the political program you have to listen to their statements carefully. "We will avenge…", "This volcano will not become dormant", "We will see who will besiege whom".
I think their aim is to create a tense situation in other parts of the territory before being dealt with by the Israeli forces. Lion's Den, PA and Israel know that when they are in Nablus for days, this will ignite tensions in other areas and most dangerously of all, they will drag the PA security apparatus into the game. Not necessarily directed by political leaders but by some sort of splinter group.
FJ: What is the relationship between PA and Lion’s Den? We heard there were some negotiations which were rejected.
YT: The PA can't arrest all Lion's Den members, so some have informal immunity. Many of them are sons of officers in the PA security apparatus. There were several offers by the PA to integrate them into the security forces, however last week's arrest of "I.H.", a sergeant in the PA [by Israel] means that it was no longer considered safe enough an option. There was a leak by the PA suggesting that 10 people had given up their guns. I contacted two of them, who both denied the reports, and said that even if there were any offers, they were later refused.
According to a PA mayor, the last time the PA offered the Lion’s Den a deal was before Saed Koni was killed in an Israeli ambush last September. They then said ‘we will see’, but when Saed was killed they rejected the offer.
The last known offer was right before the closure 10 days ago, when Israel made an offer only to those who did not injure Israeli soldiers. This involved an amnesty in exchange for giving up their weapons and staying in PA prisons for a while. This was rejected.
A Lion's Den member told me several days ago: ‘They really think we are idiots, we won't give up fighting. Period.’
FJ: What has the Israeli response been so far? Classic tactics such as collective punishment etc., or has there been a different approach?
YT: ISF has said that this would last until the situation is dealt with, and they expect a new approach in the near future. Israeli Channel 12 reporter said yesterday: "The situation won't last long, the army is considering launching a wider operation in the Old City."
FJ: What are the main issues faced by the youth in Palestine now? What is their relationship with the PA and the older generations of politicians?
YT: Unfortunately, the PA is getting old and weak. The PA is weak due to the lack of negotiations with Israel, and Palestinians are sick of the PA believing in the process.
The situation is different to what it was during Arafat's era. Arafat once told the UN General Assembly: "President of the Assembly, We have come to you with the gun of a revolutionary fighter in one hand, and the branch of an olive tree in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from me!" This statement was valid until his suspicious death in 2004.
The current PA has adopted another approach by cutting Arafat's hand with the same weapon in the statement. As Saeb Erekat (noted Palestinian politician), told me one day: "Arafat was too strong, Abbas is too weak, and in some occasions weakness can really turn into betrayal." The PA has lacked legitimacy since the internal split in 2007, but this worsened after the postponement of the elections.
I believe the way out is elections, but definitely not with Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) and his men as candidates.
FJ: What is your prediction for the near future for politics in Palestine? How will the PA respond to new armed groups and demands from the youth?
YT: I believe that we are experiencing a ‘micro model’ of the Post-PA era especially in Jenin and Nablus. If this tense situation continues, we will find ourselves in a situation described by the late Abdelsatter Qasim, Palestinian lecturer at Najah Univeristy in his book From the shame of Oslo, to the siege of Gaza. He predicted a future Palestine made up of cantons, with the PA providing services without security, and that the army will start implementing the Gaza model. "Containing the bomb" by starting to impose sanctions and closures on specific areas of the West Bank. We are currently seeing this in Nablus: hundreds of permits have been revoked and checkpoints closed and harshly restricted, while everything is open in Bethlehem.
Only yesterday, Israeli forces announced the closure of the Salem checkpoint. It was opened in summer for the first time since the second intifada, but has been closed numerous times since summer.
FJ: Are you optimistic that a new Intifada would change things?
YT: In this region, we're playing with game theory. You do not look for constants, but variables. Israel won't end the occupation, settlements will continue to grow, and the settler's fanaticism and attacks will intensify. The international community will not change its position in light of the current situation yet. I believe that a new intifada without clever leadership would only result in a worse outcome. The main point is to exploit the wave of violence for gaining political momentum and striving for change. If this ends in an intifada, we need a new PA leadership that would translate this uprising into a victory.
If not, ending the PA would also be a good outcome, as the Israelis would then need to pay for its occupation and take responsibility for the area as they did pre-1987.
I am not optimistic for a new intifada and its outcomes, but I am afraid that it would end in failure as the first and second. However, you never know. As they say: "All good things come in threes."
